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10 November 2020

(U) Chinese Government-Directed Campaign Illegally Targeting US Residents to Force Their Return to China

(U) Bulletin for state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement

(U) The Government of China—as part of a global, concerted, and extralegal repatriation effort known as "Operation Fox Hunt"—targets Chinese individuals living in the United States and other countries for alleged crimes committed under Chinese law and seeks to repatriate them to China to face charges. Some of the countries in which this activity occurs, including the United States, do not have an extradition treaty with China. As part of Operation Fox Hunt, eight individuals, allegedly acting at the direction and under the control of Chinese Government officials from 2016 to 2019, conducted surveillance of and engaged in a campaign to harass, stalk, and coerce US residents to return to China.

- (U) In October 2020, the eight defendants were <u>charged in US</u> <u>federal court</u> with conspiring to act in the United States as illegal agents of the Chinese Government. Six of the defendants also face related charges of conspiring to commit interstate and international stalking.
- (U) The defendants allegedly engaged in clandestine, unsanctioned, and illegal conduct within the United States and facilitated the travel of Chinese Government officials to US soil to further carry out these illegal acts.

(U) CONSIDERATIONS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PERSONNEL

- (U//FOUO) State and local public safety personnel should be aware that Chinese Government officials, such as diplomats and officials with China's primary law enforcement agency, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), may seek assistance to obtain sensitive US law enforcement or non-public personally identifiable information on individuals of interest.
- (U) Maintaining situational awareness of the Chinese-Government-directed tactics used to illegally identify, track, and coerce individuals in the United States may help you identify and report suspicious activity. Examples of tactics include:



(U) This graphic is unclassified.

- (U) Individuals approaching state and local law enforcement agencies for assistance, intentionally bypassing the US Government and federal law enforcement
- (U) Tasking US-based individuals to locate and contact targets

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- (U) Coercing and threatening targets and their family, friends, and associates in the United States or China
- (U) Enlisting services of private investigators to locate and surveil targets
- (U) Forcing targets' China-based relatives to travel to the United States escorted by Chinese Government officials to meet with targets
- (U) Arresting or preventing targets' relatives from leaving China

(U) The Chinese Government likely will continue targeting US residents to force their return to China. Victims and their friends and relatives may be wary of or distrust law enforcement because of previous interactions with Chinese authorities abroad. This may lead to attempts to deal directly with the perpetrators out of fear that harm may come to them or their families in China if US authorities are notified.

(U) US GOVERNMENT GUIDELINES FOR CHINESE LAW ENFORCEMENT

(U//F0U0) In 2018, the United States provided China's government with specific requirements for contacting state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement in the United States.

- (U//FOUO) Chinese MPS, National Supervision Commission (NSC), and Public Security Bureau (PSB) officials, as well as all other law enforcement officials at both the national and local levels, who wish to contact US law enforcement officials of state or local governments must first make a request to the FBI Legal Attaché stationed at the US Embassy in Beijing.
- (U//FOUO) Similarly, Police Liaison Officers (PLOs) at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, DC or at one of the Chinese Consulates in the United States who wish to contact state or local law enforcement officials in the United States must first make a request to the FBI's International Operations Division (IOD).
- (U//FOUO) MPS, NSC, PSB, and Chinese Embassy and Consulate officials may not enter into agreements with US state and local law enforcement officials, such as via memoranda of understanding, without first making a request to FBI IOD.

(U) WHAT TO DO IF CHINESE OFFICIALS CONTACT YOUR DEPARTMENT

(U//FOUO) To ensure that MPS activity within the United States is properly coordinated, the FBI requests that US law enforcement agencies notify your <u>local FBI office</u> when: 1) you become aware that the MPS or any other foreign law enforcement agency is conducting inappropriate or uncoordinated law enforcement activity; or 2) when your department receives requests for investigative assistance, training, or other law enforcement activity from the MPS or the various PSBs.

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